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Research

  • How Do Firms Respond to Gender Quotas? Evidence From California's SB826

  • Abstract

    This study examines the impact of California’s SB826, enacted in 2018 and requiring at least one female director on corporate boards by 2019, on financial performance and governance. The quota reduced the share of all-male boards by 24 percentage points without harming financial performance from 2018 to 2021. Governance measures remained stable. Firms responded with both tokenism and meaningful integration, with tokenism more common in larger boards and those in male-dominated industries. I find that SB826 reduced firms’ reliance on existing networks, suggesting that network barriers may have previously prevented some qualified women from joining boards.

  • Presentations

    Interdisciplinary Seminar Series at Columbia University (2022), Discrimination and Diversity Workshop at University of East Anglia (2022), 17th Annual Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University in St. Louis (2022), Society of Labor Economists (2024), Canadian Economics Association (2024, 2025)

  • Link to full study

  • Media

    Non-technical summary

  • Do Non-Compete Agreements Help or Harm Workers? (with Xiangru Li and Luke Rawling)

  • Abstract

    While non-compete agreements are prevalent, the incentives driving their use and their causal effects on workers remain poorly understood. We develop a model with inefficient turnover to show that non-compete agreements shift the nature of allocative inefficiency—reducing inefficient quits but increasing inefficient retention—while mitigating the canonical hold-up problem. The model predicts that non-compete agreements are more likely to be used in industries with high returns on industry-specific investments, and that signers have longer job tenures, higher wages, and receive more firm-provided investment than similar workers without such agreements. Using panel data from the NLSY97 and a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the causal impact of signing a non-compete agreement. Within one year, we find that non-compete agreements raise job tenures by 6% and wages by 9%, consistent with a compensating wage differential. In the longer run, this initial gain is eroded, as non-compete agreements reduce annual wage growth by 1%. While the theory links non-competes to firm investment, we find no evidence of increased investment in formal training, suggesting investments prompted by the agreement are likely informal.

  • Presentations

    Queen's University Faculty-PhD Working Group (2024), Organizations and Markets Workshop at Smith School of Business (2024), European Association of Labor Economists (2024), Southern Economics Association (2024), Administrative Sciences Association of Canada (2025), American Economics Association Non-Compete Agreements in Low-Wage Markets Session (Upcoming 2026)

  • Link to Full Study

  • Media

    Non-technical summary, Video Interview, Toronto Star, Americans for Tax Reform

Other Works in Progress

  • The Effects of Non-Compete Regulation (draft available upon request)
  • Mandatory Disclosure and Female Representation in Corporate Leadership: Evidence from NASDAQ (with Dhruv Baswal, Tanvir Ahmed Khan, Bailey Kraus)