Research

How Do Firms Respond to Gender Quotas? Evidence From California's SB826

Abstract

Using the passage of a California law in 2018 that required the presence of at least one woman on corporate boards by the end of 2019, I estimate the effects of gender quotas on firm performance. I find the quota rapidly reduced the share of all-male boards by thirty percentage points within one year, with no reductions in various financial outcomes within three years. These results question why all-male boards were prevalent prior to the legislation. I find that top-level experience and connections to company leaders contribute to board membership, and female candidates are less likely to possess these qualifications.

Presentations

• Interdisciplinary Seminar Series at Columbia University (2022)
• Discrimination and Diversity Workshop at University of East Anglia (2022)
• 17th Annual Economics Graduate Student Conference at Washington University in St. Louis (2022)
• Society of Labor Economists (2024)
• Canadian Economics Association (scheduled 2024)

Training and Job Separation in Imperfect Labor Markets: The Case of Non-Compete Agreements (with Xiangru Li)

Abstract

Non-compete agreements are provisions within employment contracts that prevent workers from joining competing firms. They are prevalent in the US workforce, with 38% of workers having signed such clauses at some point in their careers. Despite their vast usage, there is limited research on the incentives for workers and firms to use non-compete agreements. We show that non-compete agreements can create one market failure – inefficient lack of job separation – while mitigating a separate market failure – inefficient provision of industry-specific investment by firms. The model yields the predictions that (i) non-compete agreements are more likely to be used in industries where employer training is more "general" and (ii) non-compete signers have longer job tenures, higher wages, and receive more firm-provided investment relative to similar workers without non-compete agreements. Using newly-released panel data on the usage of non-compete agreements from the NLSY97, we test the model's predictions. Consistent with the theory, we find that non-compete signers are more concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries, remain with their employers for 3 more months than individuals without such agreements, and receive a 7% wage premium for signing a non-compete agreement. Non-compete signers do not experience higher wage growth or measures of employer provided investment.

Presentations

• Queen's University Faculty-PhD Working Group (2024)
• Organizations and Markets Workshop at Smith School of Business (scheduled 2024)
• European Association of Labor Economists (scheduled 2024)