Website created by João Cardoso

Research

  • How Do Firms Respond to Gender Quotas? Evidence From California's SB826 (Job Market Paper)

  • Abstract

    More than one-third of US-listed companies had all-male corporate boards in 2015. Quotas are discussed as policy levers to increase gender diversity, but there is much controversy whether they can increase female representation without harming organizational outcomes. Using the passage of a California law in 2018 that required the presence of at least one woman on corporate boards by the end of the following year, I estimate the effects of gender quotas on firm performance. I find the quota reduced the share of all-male boards by thirty percentage points within one year, with no reductions in operating performance, firm values, or shareholder returns within three years. These results question why all-male boards were prevalent prior to the legislation. I find that women directors are less likely to possess top-level experience and employment connections with corporate executives, which both appear as viable explanations. These findings provide insight on why women continue to lack representation in corporate leadership.

  • Presentations

    • Interdisciplinary Seminar Series (hosted by Columbia University)
    • Discrimination and Diversity Workshop (hosted by the University of East Anglia)
    • 17th Annual Economics Graduate Student Conference (hosted by Washington University in St. Louis)

  • Link to full study
  • Training and Job Separation in Imperfect Labor Markets: The Case of Non-Compete Agreements (with Xiangru Li)

  • Abstract

    Non-compete agreements are provisions within employment contracts that prevent workers from joining competing firms. They are prevalent in the US workforce, with 38% of workers having signed such clauses at some point in their careers. Despite their vast usage, there is limited research on the incentives for workers and firms to use non-compete agreements. We show that non-compete agreements can create one market failure – inefficient lack of job separation – while mitigating a separate market failure – inefficient provision of industry-specific investment by firms. The model yields the predictions that (i) non-compete agreements are more likely to be used in industries where employer training is more "general" and (ii) non-compete signers have longer job tenures, higher wages, and receive more firm-provided investment relative to similar workers without non-compete agreements. Using newly-released panel data on the usage of non-compete agreements from the NLSY97, we test the model's predictions. Consistent with the theory, we find that non-compete signers are more concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries, remain with their employers for 3 more months than individuals without such agreements, and receive a 7% wage premium for signing a non-compete agreement. Non-compete signers do not experience higher wage growth or measures of employer provided investment.

  • Presentations

    • Queen's University Faculty-PhD Working Group

  • Link to Full Study